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THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY  
IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONS*
1. The constitutional guarantees of social rights
In the Basic Law (“Grundgesetz”) – the German Constitution – a special and coher-
ent catalogue of social human rights is not foreseen. Only a few social rights’ guarantees 
primarily as to women, mothers, children and handicapped persons are explicitly stipu-
lated. Therefore, in the current German legal thought social human rights are regarded as 
neither fundamental, nor integral parts of human rights. As the full spectrum of human 
rights acknowledged in international law, among them above all the basic social human 
rights to work, education, health, accommodation, social security or social assistance 
(Articles 22–26 UDHR), does not correspond to the far more restricted catalogue of hu-
man rights explicitly figured out in the Basic Law as fundamental rights (“Grundrechte”), 
the doctrine argues even more that due to their very legal nature social human rights could 
not and never exist. 
In this understanding human rights are supposed as negative freedoms1 – a status 
negativus2 – which should open to each individual a sphere for choice and action free 
from any state intervention. Social rights, however, intend to create the positive freedom 
of the individual – a status positivus. Such a freedom is based on entitlements against 
public institutions like employment services, schools, city councils, social insurance ad-
ministrations or health services. As social rights imposes to them commitments to bring 
about and make practically feasible specific social rights, public institutions are obliged 
to become active, both on the legislative and the administrative field. Big government 
is the outcome of social rights. Can, however, human rights concur with the idea of big 
government?
All the rights of delivery, which are addressed to public institutions, depend on pre-
liminarily given public institutions, taken actions, political choices made and financial 
capabilities sufficiently available those rights are supposed to be inappropriate as human 
rights guarantees, as the individual entitlements stemming from them are not directly 
* This article has been previously published in The Right to Social Security in the Constitutions of the 
World. Broadening the Moral and Legal Space for Social Justice (ed. M. Wujczyk), Geneva 2016.
1  Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969.
2  This doctrine stems from Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1960 (3. Aufl.), 419 ff.; ibid., 
System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, Tübingen 1905 (2. Aufl.), reprinted 2011, 94 ff., 114 ff., 136 ff.
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given by the Constitution, but are to be identified and verified and, finally, made effec-
tive by acts of state legislation themselves. Those rights are therefore conceived as being 
enshrined in law, but not to be found in the guarantees of the Constitution.3
Hence, in the current German legal thinking the fundamental rights, explicitly enact-
ed in the Constitution, are taken as a pars pro toto for the human rights in general. Among 
the main scholars in German law there is a wide-spread consensus, that social human 
rights are a legal category of minor importance. Therefore, those rights do not matter or 
materialize in the conceptual framework within the German Constitution.4 
2. The scope of the martial and personal social security rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution
a) The lack of social rights in the Constitution
The Basic Law lacks a fully elaborated catalogue of social human rights.5 Only a 
few of the provisions can be interpreted as giving rights due to social need or with social 
intentions. These are above all the equal treatment clauses for men and women or with 
respect to handicapped persons (article 3 para. 2, 3 of the Basic Law). They do not only 
provide for equal rights, but also for equal living conditions to all addressed persons. So, 
they matter in the context of fundamental freedoms. Further examples are the commit-
ment to assist families, to protect mothers and their children, to guarantee equal treatment 
between marital and non-marital children and to respect the rights of collective bargain-
ing and action for both employees and employers (article 6 para.1, 2, 5; article 9 para.3 
of the Basic Law).
This constitutional arrangement can be explained by the history. The framers of the 
Constitution intentionally abstained from providing a comprehensive catalogue of social 
human rights. This decision was taken against the constitutional traditions of the Weimar 
Republic and the international developments in human rights legislation in the formative 
era of the German Constitution. It was taken, because the Basic Law intended originally 
to establish an interim regime for the western part of Germany. In the period of the con-
stitution’s formation the assumption prevailed, that after a very short period of time the 
German unification – the east-west unity – will come true. The framers of the Constitu-
tions were convinced to assume that this incident could be brought about in the very next 
3  Isensee, Der Staat 1980, 367; Scholz, RdA 1993, 249; Murswiek, in Isensee/Kirchhof, Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, Band 9 (2011), § 192.
4  Isensee, Verfassung ohne soziale Grundrechte, in Der Staat 1980, 367; Murswiek, Grundrechte als 
Teilhaberechte, soziale Grundrechte, in: Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band 9, 
2011, 3. Aufl., § 192; Brunner, Die Problematik der sozialen Grundrechte, 1971; an opposite position can 
be found in Eberhard Eichenhofer, Soziale Menschenrechte im Völker-, europäischen und deutschen Recht, 
Tübingen 2012.
5  Klee, Die progressive Verwirklichung wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und kultureller Menschenrechte, 
2000; Lohmann, Soziale Menschenrechte und die Grenzen des Sozialstaats, in Kersting (Hg.), Politische 
Philosophie des Sozialstaats, 2000, 351; Eichenhofer, Soziale Menschenrechte im Völker-, europäischen und 
deutschen Recht, Tübingen 2012.
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years after the constitutional formation of West Germany and, hence, within the foresee-
able future. So, the Constitution was explicitly sketched as a preliminary and transitional 
legislation, to be replaced in the very next future. 
This reluctance can also be explained by the constitutional history of Germany. In the 
Constitution of the Weimar Republic of 1919 the social human rights played a pivotal role 
as an integral part of a broad and comprehensive catalogue of human rights, which had 
a similar profile than the one, enacted on the international level after World War II. As to 
the Weimar Republic Constitution of August 11th, 1919, the economic life should coincide 
with the principles of social justice and follow the aim to guarantee a life in human dignity 
to each human being (article 151). Human labour has to be protected by a unified labour 
law (article 157). The freedom of association and collective bargaining is guaranteed to 
both employees and employers (article 159). The right to social insurance (article 161) 
was guaranteed. In general, it was stated, that irrespective of the individual freedom each 
citizen is exposed to the moral commitment, to utilize her/his physical or intellectual capa-
bility for the common good. Under there auspices each citizen should have a right to work 
in order to acquire his or her personal maintenance (article 163). Employees are entitled to 
take part in the gestion of enterprises. For this purpose works councils shall be established 
on the level of a factory, the enterprise, or on regional or national level (article 165).
The Weimar Constitution served even more as a model for the international enact-
ment of social human rights, as it was – apart from the Mexico Constitution of 1917 and 
the Constitution of Finland of 1919 – one of the first constitutions of the World which 
did provide for fundamental social human rights. But in the Weimar Republic the courts 
interpreted these human rights as provisions of a mere programmatic character, which 
did not have any binding effect – neither to the courts, nor the administration, nor finally 
the legislator.6 
The framers of the Basic Law intended to avoid this arguing for the future definitely. 
It was the overall intention of them to make the Constitution a strictly and uncondition-
ally mandatory piece of legislation, which as the supreme law of the land, should be 
acknowledged and regarded as being paramount to all other legal provisions and to abide 
without any reservation. As to the strictness of constitution, there was the assumption 
made, that this imperative could not cope with a social rights’ guarantee, which leaves 
not only a wide room for interpretation, but depends also on legislative implementation.
Furthermore, the Basic Law as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 
did not intend to create a comprehensive Constitution, but to give shape to a provisional 
and interim status for the former West Germany to regain its sovereignty and at the same 
time to leave open the door for a re-unification of the then divided Germany. As to Carlo 
Schmid, a leading intellectual and Member of the Parliamentarian Assembly, the Basic 
Law shall not constitute, but organise the state.7 So, the reluctance to implement social 
rights into the framework of the fundamental rights can also be explained by the concern 
not to anticipate a social order for a unified Germany, which should be established later 
on the basis of a new constitution. 
6  RGZ 113, 33, 37; 116, 268, 273.
7  Speech of October 20th, 1948.
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When 1990 the east-west divide of Germany had been overcome, the Constitution of 
West Germany was kept and not revised despite of its fragmentarian character, as it was 
regarded at that time as the best Constitution Germany ever had before, and, therefore the 
opinion prevailed, that the unification did not give any ground for its revision. So, under 
the constitutional law of Germany after the unification the previous incompleteness of the 
Constitution as to the social sphere was kept.
b) The “social state” – clause (articles 20, 28 of the Basic Law)
The Basic Law established a substitute for its lacking social human rights; this is 
the principle of the “social state” (Sozialstaat). In articles 20, 28 of the Basic Law Ger-
many defines itself as a democratic, federal, republican and social state, which is based 
on the rule of Law. These five characteristics of the German state cannot be altered, nor 
abolished even not by a change of the Constitution itself (article 79 para.3 of the Basic 
Law). These five characteristics assume with other words the character of “eternal”, i.e. 
unchangeable principles of the Constitution.
As to the social state clause the state has to control, on whether from the freedoms 
guaranteed under the constitution follow detrimental social effects, above all inacceptable 
disequalities, unjustifiable differences as to incomes, pensions or social status. Whenever 
those impacts are about to happen, the state is obliged to react and light against poverty 
and exclusion, reduce inequalities in income and fortune and to overcome social depend-
encies. Under the social state clause the state is supposed to make a social order becoming 
to exist, which is based on “social justice”8 and shrives to overcome “social contracts”.9
From this characteristic of Germany as a “social state”10 does not stem any individual 
rights’ guarantee, but it obliges the state to create a whole range of social legislation, 
which has to create individual social rights. So, under the social state clause the state 
becomes mandatory to create social rights, which have to assume a legal, but not a con-
stitutional rank.
c) Protection of social rights under other constitutional principles and rules
The lack of genuine social human rights in the German Constitution brought about 
a debate under the legal perspective on whether those social rights could find any con-
stitutional attention at all. In the course of the developing case law of the German Con-
stitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) various contexts became relevant as to the 
question on whether those rights could be get any protection under another angle of con-
 8  BVerfGE 22, 180, 204; 59, 231, 263; 69, 272, 314; 94, 241, 263; 110, 412, 445.
 9  BVerfGE 1, 97, 105; 43, 213, 226.
10  Forsthoff, Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtsstaates, in: ders. (Hg.), Rechtsstaatlichkeit und 
Sozialstaatlichkeit, 1968, 165, 180: „A Constitution can never be a social law.” „Eine Verfassung kann nicht 
Sozialgesetz sein“; Hartwich, Sozialstaatspostulat und gesellschaftlicher status quo, 1978 (3. Aufl.); Zacher, 
Das soziale Staatsziel, in Isensee/Kirchhof (Hg.), Handbuch Staatsrecht, Bd. 2, 2004 (3. Aufl.), § 28, 428; 
Spieker (Hg.), Der Sozialstaat, 2012; Heinig, Der Sozialstaat im Dienst der Freiheit, 2008; Wallrabenstein, 
Versicherung im Sozialstaat, 2009.
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stitutional law. As the German Constitution strives to give a full-fledged protection of 
the individual as to all circumstances, which stem from acts of the state, the freedom of 
action (article 2 para. 1 of the Basic Law), the equality (article 3 para. 1 of the Basic Law) 
and the property clauses (article 14 of the Basic Law) had been addressed as instruments 
to protect social rights. 
As to the universal guarantee of the freedom of action the Constitutional Court did 
examine on whether a legal provision on a mandatory inclusion in a special scheme of 
old age protection for self-employed medical doctors can cope with the freedom of ac-
tion.11 The Court held that this is possible, as the obligatory inclusion into social security 
schemes is to be assessed as an appropriate means to a legitimate end, necessary and 
proportionate to achieve its end. As to the social legislation a series of very distinct ques-
tions had been examined by the Constitutional Court, on whether they comply with the 
principle of equality of each person before the law. As to the case law of the Constitu-
tional Court social legislation has to be enacted in accordance with the principle of equal 
treatment of each person.12
This provision does not require that differences are not allowed, nor does it hinder the 
legislator to make distinctions if there is a good cause for doing this, nor does it embar-
rass that social legislation is built upon typical cases,13 which does not appropriately fit to 
atypical situations. The equality of treatment is, however, not granted, if distinctions are 
made which lack a convincing ground. So, the equal treatment clause is hurt, if a social 
legislation is based upon irrational and unjustifiable distinctions.
Since the first years of the Constitutional Court case law there was a broad debate 
about whether under the German Constitution a social right can be conceived as a prop-
erty right.14 Whereas the Federal Social Security Court15 already very early qualified so-
cial insurance rights as property under the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court held in the 
formative era till 1980, that social insurance does not correspond with the requirements 
to property, which are peculiar to an entitlement under private law. Social insurance rights 
are, however, rights under public law; so they could fall into the substantial scope of the 
property clause of the Basic Law. But in 1980 the Constitutional Court16 changed its posi-
11  BVerfGE 10, 354; 12, 319; 75, 108; further BVerwGE 87, 324.
12  BVerfGE 54, 11; 59, 287; 66, 234; 72, 141; 89, 365; 92, 53; 97, 103; 99, 165; 100, 195; 102, 68; 103, 
242; 105, 73; 111, 176; 125, 75.
13  BVerfGE 63, 119; 66, 66; 67, 231.
14  BVerfGE 32, 111; vgl. zur Problematik: Adam, Eigentumsschutz in der gesetzlichen 
Rentenversicherung, 2009; Axer, in Epping/Hillgruber, BeckOK GG, 2012, Art. 14 Rn. 56 ff.; Boecken, 
Der verfassungsrechtliche Schutz von Altersrentenansprüchen und -anwartschaften in Italien und in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland sowie deren Schutz im Rahmen der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, 
1987; Jährling-Rahnefeld, Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Grundrente, 2002; Krause, Eigentum an subjektiven 
öffentlichen Rechten, 1982; Lenze, Staatsbürgerversicherung und Verfassung, 2005; Papier, in von Maydel/
Ruland/Becker (Hg.) Sozialrechtshandbuch, 2012 (5. Aufl.), § 3 Rn. 41 ff.; Pohl, Rechtsprechungsänderung 
und Rückanknüpfung, 2005; Preis/Kellermann, SGb 1999, 329; Reiter, SGb 1996, 246 ff.; Stober (Hg.), 
Eigentumsschutz sozialrechtlicher Positionen, 1986.
15  BSGE 9, 127.
16  BVerfGE 53, 257.
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tion and accepted, hat also social insurance rights are to be conceived as property under 
the Basic Law. 
This case law coincides with the one of the ECHR. But the meaning and the substan-
tial scope of application of the property clause differs as to the case law of both courts. 
Under the latter all social benefits based on a legal entitlement can be taken as property in 
the meaning of the 1 st Additional Protocol to ECHR.17 Under the German constitutional 
law, however, only those social rights can be regarded as property, which are based and 
stem from own contributions made by payments to the social security administration or 
own work.18
Under the property clause the legislator is not only committed, but acts also in a 
legitimate manner, if it both defines the social insurance rights and at the same time or 
reduces social insurance rights, because both acts are accepted or provided for under the 
property clause.19 As to article 14 para. 1 of the Basic Law, the legislator has to give shape 
to the content of property and it has to establish the limits of property. The Basic Law 
establishes property only with within social limits; the use of property shall also serve to 
the public benefit (“Eigentum verpflichtet, sein Gebrauch soll zugleich dem Wohle der 
Allgemeinheit dienen”, article 14 para.2 of the Basic Law). From this follows clearly, that 
also restrictions of social insurance rights are permitted under the Constitution, unless 
they are appropriate to make the social insurance burden bearable to the active popula-
tion and proportionate and, finally, the amount of benefits keeps on to be substantial and 
adequate to the beneficiary. 
In the context of the right to social assistance quite early in the legal history of post- 
war West Germany the question emerged on whether such a right has a sound constitu-
tional fundament. The Federal Administrative Court20 held already 1951 in one of its first 
judgments, that under the Constitution a social assistance beneficiary has not only a legal 
entitlement to social help, but that this right is embedded in and stem from the consti-
tutional guarantee of human dignity and that it will find in this principle its conceptual 
fundament. In its sequent case law the Constitutional Court21 joined this perspective and 
held, that human dignity in combination with the social state clause bring about a funda-
mental right to protection of a minimum level existence. This should be in the absence 
of other preliminary sources be guaranteed by the public administration, which should 
become active as a lender of the last resort. On this basis the Constitutional Court hold, 
that the individual’s right to a minimum level of existence encompasses the socio- cul-
tural minimum. This means, with other words, that not only the physical existence has to 
be guaranteed, but that, additionally to this, by means of social assistance the social and 
cultural participation of the beneficiary is to be made feasible. The Court also held that 
the level of social assistance benefits is to be determined in a transparent manner and on 
17  ECHMR 16.9.1996 (Gaygusuz / Austria) 17371/90; 7.5.2002 (Burdov / Russia) 59498/00; 25.10.2005 
(Romanov / Russia); 30.9.2003 (Koua Poirrez / France) 40892/98; 12.4.2006 (Stec / United Kingdom) 
65731/01; 65900/01.
18  BVerfGE 69, 272, 301; 100, 1; 59, 104.
19  BVerfGE 97, 271; 122, 151.
20  BVerwGE 1, 159.
21  BVerfGE 132, 134; 125, 175.
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the basis of a rational method to identify and assess the specific needs to be covered by 
means of social assistance.
d) Impact of the international protection of social rights
In the German legal system the international social rights, enacted in many provi-
sions of international law – among them above all the UN, ILO, Council of Europe and 
EU legislation is relevant in the sense, that the leading provisions on social rights are 
transformed into the German legislation. By this act of transformation of international 
into national law the international law rules assume the characteristic of a provision under 
German law. Therefore it has the same rank as provisions under the legislation of Ger-
many. If the international provision has the same content as the corresponding provision 
under German law, the latter will prevail to the first. So, under these circumstances the 
provision under German law is regarded as paramount to the international one. If there 
is a provision under international law, whereas a corresponding provision in German law 
is lacking, the international law demands for a complementary provision to be enacted in 
German law. 
But there is a huge reluctance within the German judiciary to give an international 
law rule such an important impact that it will make a revision of internal law a legal 
imperative.22 There is a widespread reservation to international law, which is challenged 
predominantly as an act of intrusion and violation of national sovereignty. For those, 
who are not familiar with international law, but practise on the basis of the domestic law 
cultivate a widely diffused resentment against international law, which is not regarded as 
a fundament of or a frame of reference for domestic law, but which is seen as alien and 
so non-genuine component of domestic law and, hence, of law at all. So, there is up to 
now a widely shared tendency to minimize or even annihilate the impact of international 
law on national legislation. This tendency is also driven by the case law of the Constitu-
tional Court, which is keen, with varying degrees of intensity and rigor to minimise the 
influence of international law on German law. The main argument in this context is that 
the national Constitution is the supreme law of the land and that therefore also the in-
ternational law, when incorporated into national legislation ,has to comply with national 
Constitutional law and because of this assume a lower rank as to the Constitution. This 
reasoning, however, does not So, the role of international social rights to the German 
social legislation is still rather incremental and rarely to be fully observed.
But this argument cannot uphold under the Basic Law itself. As to article 1 para 2 of 
the Basic Law the German people confesses to respect the unalienable human rights as 
fundaments of each human society and imperative as indispensable basis of peace in the 
world. This provision makes the international human rights in their entirety an integral 
part of the German human rights legislation and, hence, it imposes to it to regard them 
completely.
22  BVerfGE 111, 307.
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3. The constitutional regulations’ impact on the content of social security 
rights
a) Social rights in ordinary legislation
Within the social legislation of Germany the Social Code plays an important role, as 
it contains all the relevant provisions on social legislation in Germany. In integral part of 
this legislation is to be found in the basic social rights.23 They are enacted in the introduc-
tory and most general part of the Social Code. It plays a key role to outline the purpose, 
function, structure and content of the German system of social security.
Despite of this, a strong civilicism is to be noticed as to the binding effect of social 
rights. In the legal literature they are assessed as lacking any “normative substance”,24 
they are conceived as irrelevant.25 But this characteristic is not justified. As to the official 
justification26 the social rights in the context of the Social Code shall describe the targets 
of social benefits; it shall keep pace with the international development, where a rights-
based approach to social legislation becomes more and more common and gained ground. 
Social rights shall emphasize, that the individual in a modern welfare state is supposed to 
be not an object for social policy but that social policy intends to establish the beneficiary 
as a subject of rights.
Seen from a systematic point of view, social rights in the Social Code help to translate 
the goal of social justice into the structure of the various social branches of protection. 
They are not made in order to create specific social rights, but to outline the normative 
basis on which social entitlements are built upon.
b) Justiciability of social rights
As to the low awareness for social rights their justiciability is not a key issue. On the 
contrary under the arguments put forward against social right their alleged injusticiability, 
plays a leading role. So, due to the meagre role social rights play in the current legal de-
bate in Germany, the problem of the justiciability of social rights did not attract a broader 
interest among the legal scholars in Germany so far.
c) Growing awareness of social rights
Despite of the profound reservations as to social rights as such and to the constitu-
tional guarantee of these rights especially, the constitutional dimensions of the legisla-
tion on social protection substantially gained ground and got a growing attention. In the 
context of the constitutional provisions on human dignity, equality of rights, protection of 
23  Eichenhofer, in Eichenhofer/Wenner (Hg.), Wannagat SGB I, IV, X, 2012, § 2 SGB I Rn. 2 ff.
24  Von Maydell, Die „sozialen Rechte“ im Allgemeinen Teil des SGB, DVBl 1976, 1, 6.
25  Karlheinz Rode, Zum Wesen der sogenannten „sozialen Rechte“ im Sozialgesetzbuch – Allgemeiner 
Teil, SGb 1977, 268, 272; Hauck/Noftz, SGB I, § 2 I 2; Schnapp/Meyer, Zur Entwicklung von sozialen Rechten 
in der Sozialgesetzgebung, DRV 1973, 66 ff.; Manfred W. Wienand, Bedeutungsgehalt und Funktionen der 
sozialen Rechte im Allgemeinen Teil des Sozialgesetzbuches, 1980.
26  Bundestags-Drucksache VI/3746, S. 16.
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freedom, property rights, protection against all sorts of discrimination and respect of the 
rule of law a series of social policy measures attracted a broad attention in Constitutional 
law, in the case law of the Constitutional Court and, finally, in the doctrine.
4. Threats to social security rights in times of economic crisis
In the context of social rights as human rights the idea of rights coincides with the 
idea of social obligations. Under the Constitution the parental right to care for and edu-
cate the children coincides the assumption, that the parents are obliged to make use of 
their rights, otherwise the parental rights are to be withdrawn (article 6 para 2 of the Basic 
Law). 
This principle that social rights and social commitments concur is a general feature 
of all social rights. As to article 14 para 2 of the Basic Law the property rights are also 
limited by social aims. If the constitutional property clause also applies to social rights, 
also the social limitation clause matters for social rights. As to these two restrictions – the 
committing strand of social rights and the social limitation of property rights – a theo-
retical justification can be found for adjusting social rights in times of economic crisis. 
So, social rights are not to be regarded as absolute rights in the sense, that their content 
is to be protected irrespective of the conditions under which the contributions live and 
work. If there are recession and unemployment, wage cutbacks or a shrinking number of 
contributing insured persons the legislator is not embarrassed to reduce benefits in order 
to keep the balance between the beneficiaries’ rights and the contributor’s commitments. 
As the latter depend directly on the first, the Constitution provides for compromising the 
conflicting portions in a proportionate manner.27 If such compromise is to be found out, 
the most vulnerable beneficiaries should be protected and the less vulnerable beneficiar-
ies should bear the higher share.28
5. Assessment of the future of social security rights in the light of the 
Constitution
There is an indication on the increasing awareness of international social rights as to 
their impact on the domestic legislation. This tendency is not to be restricted to a single 
part of legislation but it represents an overall and all-embracing trend. In this context 
of an increasing international impact on national constitutional law the human rights’ 
guarantees for social rights become more and more important. So, there is some reason to 
assume a growing influence of international law to the further development of domestic 
law. As social human rights play a key role in international law they will also become 
more important for domestic law in the years to come.
27  BVerfGE 36, 73; 54, 11; 58, 81; 64, 87; 100, 59.
28  BVerfGE 87, 1.
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Summary
In the Basic Law (“Grundgesetz”) – the German Constitution – a special and coherent catalogue 
of social human rights is not foreseen. Only a few social rights’ guarantees primarily as to women, 
mothers, children and handicapped persons are explicitly stipulated. Therefore, in the current Ger-
man legal thought social human rights are regarded as neither fundamental, nor integral parts of 
human rights. As the full spectrum of human rights acknowledged in international law, among them 
above all the basic social human rights to work, education, health, accommodation, social security 
or social assistance (Articles 22–26 UDHR), does not correspond to the far more restricted catalogue 
of human rights explicitly figured out in the Basic Law as fundamental rights (“Grundrechte”), the 
doctrine argues even more that due to their very legal nature social human rights could not and never 
exist. 
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